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I. INTRODUCTION

On October 26, 2012, The University of Akron School of Law's
Center for Intellectual Property and Technology hosted its Sixth Annual
IP Scholars Forum. In attendance were thirteen legal scholars with
expertise and an interest in IP and public health who met to discuss
problems and potential solutions at the intersection of these fields. This
report summarizes this discussion by describing the problems raised,
areas of agreement and disagreement between the participants,
suggestions and solutions made by participants, and the subsequent
evaluations of these suggestions and solutions.
Led by the moderator, participants at the Forum focused generally
on three broad questions. First, are there alternatives to the patent
system or specific patent doctrines that can provide or help provide
sufficient incentives for health-related innovation? Second, is health
information being used proprietarily, and if so, is this use appropriate?
Third, does IP conflict with other non-IP values that are important in
health, and how does or how can IP law help resolve these conflicts?
This report addresses each of these questions in tum.
II. THE PATENT SYSTEM AND ITS ALTERNATIVES

The IP Forum began by noting that although there are numerous
problems with the patent system, such as high costs for prosecution 1 and
litigation, 2 uncertainty as to patent validity, 3 and nebulous terms and
concepts like "non-obviousness," "utility," and "novelty," 4 many
consider patent law the primary driver of health-related innovation in the
United States. 5 In fact, some have argued that patents are the best way
to incentivize innovation and that the United States patent system is the

I. See Ted Sichelman & Stuart J.H. Graham, Patenting by Entrepreneurs: An
Study, 17 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 111, 167-68 (2010).
2. See James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, lessons for Patent Policy From
Research on Patent litigation, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. I, 2 (2005).
3. See Harry Surden, Efficient Uncertainty in Patent Interpretation, 68 WASH.
REV. 1737, 1740-42 (2011).
4. See Tun-Jen Chiang, A Cost-Benefit Approach to Patent Obviousness, 82 ST.
REV. 39, 40-41 (2008).
5. See Anna B. Laakmann, An Explicit Policy lever for Patent Scope,

Empirical
Empirical
& LEE L.
JOHN'S L.

19 MICH.
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 43, 93 (2012) (stating that "[p]atent law shapes biomedical
innovation," but noting that federal research funding also plays a role); see also Andrew W.
Torrance, Nothing Under the Sun that is Made of Man 31 (Oct. 24, 2012) (unpublished manuscript)
(on file with reporter) ("Biotechnology owes much of its rapid progress to the availability of patent
protection for genes and their polypeptide products.").
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best in the world. 6 The underlying rationale is an oft-told story. We
have a free market economy which ultimately lets consumers decide, ex
post, which innovations were worthy investments of research and
development. 7 This may be superior to a grant system which, ex ante,
puts the valuation decision in the hands of the government or other
institutions and could squander limited resources on ineffective,
inefficient, or impractical innovations. 8 In short, the market can, and
should, provide the incentive~ for innovation.
The discussion began by questioning this traditional premise. Is it
true that markets are the best way to incentivize health-reiated
innovation? Are there alternatives to the patent system that would work
better? Or are there ways to improve the patent system so it works
better? 9
A. Incentivizing What?
An important and foundational issue to discerning how the patent
system can be improved or what alternatives would be better is
understanding what goals the patent system should seek to achieve and
whether it actually achieves them. Apropos of the Forum's focus on
health care, these same questions can be asked with respect to the role of
patents driving innovation in health care. Nevertheless, strong reasons
for market failure in health care innovation make asking these same
questions particularly difficult.
For hundreds of years we have thought that the patent system is the
best system for innovation, but we really have no idea whatsoever.
Reference was made to a National Academy of Sciences study, which

6. See United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287, 335 n.12 (1948) (Burton, J.,
dissenting) (citing H.R. Doc. No. 78-239, available in National Patent Planning Commission, The
American Patent System, 25 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 455, 457 (1943) ("The strongest industrial nations
have the most effective patent systems, and after a careful study, the Commission has reached the
conclusion that the American system is the best in the world.")).
7. Jane M. Marciniszyn, What Has Happened Since Chakrabarty?, 2 J.L. & HEALTH 141,
141-42 (1988) (quoting Arthur R. Whale, 7 APLA Q.J. 172 (1979)); see also SUZANNE
SCOTCHMER, INNOVATION AND INCENTIVES 58 (2006) ("As an incentive mechanism, intellectual
property has the following virtues: I. The reward is linked to the social value of the invention, so
that firms will, to some degree, compare social value and social cost when deciding whether to
invest. 2. Users of the intellectual property voluntarily pay the costs, so no one objects to its
development.").
8. See Michael Abramowicz, Perfecting Patent Prizes, 56 VAND. L. REV. 115, 194-95
(2003).
9. One such proposal for reforming patent law is included in Thomas C. Folsom, Algorithm
Methods and Their Biological Issue (Oct. 20, 2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
reporter).
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concluded that "we need a much more detailed understanding of how the
patent system affects innovation in various sectors." 1 For example,
patents could work wonderfully to incentivize innovation in the
biotechnology sector, but could stifle innovation in the computer
hardware sector. Other studies suggest that our patent system may not
be incentivizing innovation at an optimal rate. 11 It could be that the
patent system is the best system for promoting innovation. Perhaps it is
not. But if we choose to rely on the patent system for so much, such as
providing excellent innovations in health care, then we really should
have a better idea rather than simply assuming this is the case. As
mentioned earlier, the reasons for market failure make health care an
especially difficult case.
Perhaps a more fundamental issue is what patents, or any other
systems, are supposed to incentivize. Are they supposed to incentivize
invention, development (i.e. delivering inventions in tangible ways), or
both? If both, to what extent?
Although both invention and
development relate to innovation, they are two distinct parts of the
process. For example, it was noted that medical technologies often
come out of research universities based on subsidies. It is after patents
are applied for or obtained that pharmaceutical and medical device
companies develop these technologies. This illustrates the importance of
patents on the development side rather than the invention side. Yet,
without the proper focus on invention and development, this may lead to
less than optimal results. For example, having a lot of inventions that
are never developed is undesirable. Likewise, fully developing the only
existing invention is undesirable. It seems that the system we endorse
should try to drive both invention and development. 12

°

B. Overbroad and Overcomplex?

A potential problem with relying on the patent system to incentivize
health-related innovation is the overbreadth and overcomplexity of the
patent system. Jim Chen suggested that the problem with the Patent Act
was its Swiss army knife characteristic - it tries to accomplish
10. NAT'L. RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT'L. ACADS., A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST
CENTURY 2 (Stephen A. Merrill et al. eds., 2004).
I I. See, e.g., Andrew W. Torrance & Bill Tomlinson, Patents and the Regress of Useful Arts,
10 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 130, 167 (2009).
12. See Jay Dratler, Jr., Invention is a Process, or Why the Electronics and Pharmaceutical
Industries are at Loggerheads over Patents (Univ. of Akron Sch. of Law Legal Studies Research
No.
06-13,
2006),
available
at
Paper
Series,
Paper
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfin?abstract_id=899924.
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everything by having been written with broad applicability and without
being technology-specific. The Patent Act serves as an open charter for
innovation much like the Sherman Act does for free enterprise and
competition. 13 The Patent Act can be considered overbroad at the
formal statutory level because it is written as if it were a constitution. 14
In fact, the core of the Patent Act is a few sections with short phrases
replete with excessive generalities. 15 It is unlike the Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act, which is a classic regulatory statute with amazing
specificity. 16
Some Forum participants argued that overcomplexity results
because of this broad, constitution-like language. Congress has, by
using broad language, delegated innovation policy to the courts to
develop common law-esque doctrines under the language of sections
101, 102, 103, and 112 of the Patent Act. 17 Because of this delegation,
the courts have created an extraordinarily complex system that appears
ad hoc and devoid of any meaningful structure tied to the validity of
science or its application to solving human problems. 18
For several participants, one of the major flaws of the patent system
is that it is too general and does not focus on separate technologies or
industries. TRIPS now requires this uniform approach to patent law. 19
13. Craig Allen Nard, legal Forms and the Common law of Patents, 90 B.U. L. REV. 51, 53
(2010) (asserting patent stakeholders should keep in mind that the patent code, much like the
Sherman Act, is a common law enabling statute, leaving ample room for courts to fill in the
interstices or to create doctrine emanating solely from Article Ill's province).
14. One explanation for this is that the first patent act, Act of April 10, 1790, ch. 7, I Stat.
109, which serves as the basis for the current patent act, was written nearly contemporaneously with
the U.S. Constitution.
15. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § IOI (2012) (listing patentable subject matter as covering processes,
machines, manufactures, or compositions of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof);
35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012) ("A patent may not be obtained ... if the differences between the subject
matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would
have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to
which said subject matter pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the
invention was made.").
16. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-399d (2012).
17. Obviousness, inherent anticipation, and infringement under the doctrine of equivalents
are all examples of vague, but key, concepts that courts have been forced to develop as a result of
Congress's use of broad language in the Patent Act.
18. See Jay Dratler, Jr., Fixing Our Broken Patent System, 14 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV.
47, 66 n.60 (2010).
19. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 27(1 ), Apr.
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC, 1869
U.N.T.S. 299, 33 l.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS) ("Subject to the provisions of paragraphs
2 and 3, patents shall be available for any inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields of
technology, provided that they are new, involve an inventive step and are capable of industrial
application. Subject to paragraph 4 of Article 65, paragraph 8 of Article 70 and paragraph 3 of this
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But not all participants agreed this was problematic. There was a fairly
even split on whether the Patent Act's one-size-fits-all approach was a
good idea. Some detractors of TRIPS's uniformity principle viewed
varied patent terms, stronger patentability requirements, and the need for
actual reduction to practice as positive developments for invention and
development.
To justify the TRIPS approach to a broad, non-discriminatory
patent system, participants pointed out that when the U.S. patent system
was first created, the United States was a least-developed country, and
the hope for our patent system was from that perspective. We used this
system to move from newly-released colony to world power. Perhaps
this same approach can be useful to other developing nations and permit
them to rapidly innovate like the United States has done.
With respect to the Patent Act bearing resemblance to a
constitution, participants pointed out that that this broad language has
served as an umbrella to more than one patent system. That is, our
patent system has changed based on how the courts have interpreted the
broad standards set forth in the Patent Act. And it is for this reason that
we cannot answer the question of whether the patent system works; it is
always changing due to changed circumstances. We have ratcheted up
and down the standards for obviousness, patentable subject matter,
utility, etcetera; and the one-size-fits-all approach has allowed this to
happen. 20
Although courts have traditionally undertaken this "ratcheting"
role, we should also ask what other institutions should play a role in
shaping innovation policy. Sometimes courts shape policy in a way that
includes other institutions, such as the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
(PTO), industry stakeholders, and the general public, 21 but not always.
Perhaps the PTO should be more involved in the process of establishing
policy to incentivize innovation. 22 Given its frequent interactions with
innovators, the PTO may be well-situated to help determine if the rules
we have established for promoting innovation actually reflect how
innovation takes place. Alternatively, or perhaps additionally, we may
Article, patents shall be available and patent rights enjoyable without discrimination as to the place
of invention, the field of technology and whether products are imported or locally produced.")
(emphasis added).
20. See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575,
1576-77 (2003).
21. See generally Ryan Vacca, Acting Like an Administrative Agency: The Federal Circuit
En Banc, 76 Mo. L. REV. 733 (2011).
22. See Melissa F. Wasserman, The Changing Guard of Patent Law: Chevron Deference for
the PTO, 54 WM & MARYL. REV. 1959, 2007-18 (2013).
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need some other administrative agency or non-governmental
organization to give its input on innovation policy. Whatever form it
takes, it could be helpful in developing a focused and particularized
patent system or an effective, broad system, but at least it would be a
more informed system. 23
Despite some participants' pushes for a more technology-specific
approach to patent law, others were resistant. A comparison was made
between this approach to patent law and copyright law. In contrast to
the Patent Act, the Copyright Act has incredibly detailed provisions. 24 It
was suggested that before adopting a detailed approach to patent law, we
must ask ourselves whether the current patent system is worse than the
copyright system. To some, it is not clear that it is worse.
C. Alternatives to the Patent System

Participants discussed many alternatives to the patent system. The
list of possibilities that could incentivize innovation included Regulatory
Competitive Shelters (RCSs ), 25 such as the exclusive marketing periods
for certain generic drugs, biologicals, and other innovations provided
under the Hatch-Waxman Act and similar statutes; 26 prizes; 27
government subsidies and education; 28 other types of IP, such as
copyright protection; 29 and open user and collaborative innovation
systems. 30 RCSs and collectively governed systems received the most
attention and are discussed in detail below.
Despite the variety of alternatives to patents, participants noted that
the success of these alternatives depends on the industry and technology.
One system may work very well for the medical industry, but not so well

23. If it turns out that a particularized, technology-specific system is optimal, then article 27
of TRIPS very much hamstrings our ability to use patent rights most effectively. See TRIPS, supra
note 19.
24. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. §§I 10(5), I 11, 112, 114, 115 (2012).
25. See discussion infra Part 11.C. I.
26. See generally Yaniv Heled, Regulatory Competitive Shelters - An Emerging Class of
Administrative Properties (Oct. 17, 2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with reporter).
27. See, e.g., XPRIZE, http://www.xprize.org (last visited Aug. 20, 2014); see also Steven
Shaven & Tanguy Van Ypersele, Rewards Versus Intellectual Property Rights, 44 J.L. & ECON.
525, 525-26 (2001).
28. See Paul M. Romer, Endogenous Technological Change, 98 J. POL. ECON. S71, S96-97
(1990).
29. See, e.g., Andrew W. Torrance, DNA Copyright, 46 VAL. U. L. REV. I, 3 (2011); Dan L.
Burk, Copyrightability ofRecombinant DNA Sequences, 29 JURIMETRICS J. 469, 4 70-71 (1989).
30. See discussion infra Part 11.C.2; see generally Katherine J. Strandburg, User Innovator
Community Norms: At the Boundary Between Academic and Industry Research, 77 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2237 (2009).
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for the software industry. Even within a particular industry, optimal
systems may vary. For example, within the medical industry, one
alternative might work very well for pharmaceuticals, but not great for
medical devices. Perhaps an alternative works well for diabetes drugs,
but not very well for cancer drugs. This analysis can become fractured
very quickly when discussing whether and to what extent these
alternatives work.
Another suggested alternative to incentivizing innovation was not
really an alternative system, but a rejection of all systems. Taken from
Matt Ridley's work, one participant posited that innovation simply
happens regardless of what we do to incentivize it. 31 That is, innovation
happens at an increasing trend because there are more and more ideas
and more and more people to combine ideas - and it may not matter if
we have patents, copyrights, prizes, regulations, or anything else for that
matter. 32 Innovation occurs whether we want it or not. This was a
comforting thought to some who were convinced that it is impossible to
design a system where moneyed-interests are not trying to get the best
advantage and where the behemoths that developed the initial
technology have driven innovators to work within that ecosystem rather
than develop an entirely new one. 33
1. Regulatory Competitive Shelters
One solution proposed by Yaniv Heled was the further use of
RCSs, which are specifically crafted shelters from competition afforded
by the government to give competitive advantages to those who invest in
bringing technology to the market. 34 An example of an RCS regime is
the one instituted under the Hatch-Waxman Act whereby the U.S. Food
and Drug Administration (FDA) affords a variety of exclusivity periods
to drug developers who disclose clinical trial data about new chemical
entities, new uses for old drugs (including in pediatric populations), and
bioequivalence data. 35 A participant suggested that a system of RCSs
31. See generally MATT RIDLEY, THE RATIONAL OPTIMIST: How PROSPERITY EVOLVES
(Harper Collins Publishers 2010).
32. Id.
33. See, e.g., FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, To PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER
BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY 6-7 (2003) ("One panelist asserted that
the time and money his software company spends on creating and filing these so-called defensive
patents, which 'have no ... innovative value in and of themselves,' could have been better spent on
developing new technologies.") (internal citations omitted).
34. See Heled, supra note 26.
35. 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(c)(3)(E), 355(a) (2012); see also Pandemic and All-Hazards
Preparedness Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-5, 127 Stat. 161, 191-92 (codified as
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replace the difficult concepts of novelty and non-obviousness with
experimental results on safety and efficacy, 36 which is what scientists in
the health care industry really desire. In addition, an RCS system would
not involve the costs of patent prosecution and the ensuing litigation,
claim construction, or the difficult concept of non-obviousness which, it
was noted, helps promote attorneys' fees, but not much innovation.
However, there was concern that if we used an RCS model instead
of a patent model, then we would simply shift the costs and uncertainties
of complications from the patent system to the FDA, which has its own
institutional delays and inefficiencies. Perhaps the FDA's delays and
inefficiencies are less pronounced than those in the PTO and in the
patent litigation context, but it was agreed that an RCS model is not a
panacea.
One comment made about RCSs was that the data submitted to the
FDA are typically held in confidence. This concerned some participants.
If exclusivity is given, then why the need for all of the secrecy? 37 Some
participants argued that consumers should know more about clinical trial
results so they can make more informed choices about whether they are
willing to pay more for a new drug than an old one.
Other participants further noted that just because it may be
desirable to have different solutions for different areas of technology,
this does not mean that immediately regulating every emerging
technology or industry is advisable. In fact, someone suggested that the
patent system is probably a good default system until a certain industry
or technology gets its own regulatory system. But once regulation of a
certain area starts, RCSs are a good method of incentivizing innovation.
Of course, RCSs are not perfect, but they do take scientists and
consumers down to real world utility that is important. In addition to the
concerns expressed above, some problems with RCSs are: (1) they are
subject to abuse; (2) rarely is there an effective advocate for the public
as a whole; and (3) an agency serves as a gatekeeper, and sometimes
agencies get captured. Of course, patents may suffer from the same
problems. Despite these potential problems, RCSs may solve some
industries' problems, and it may be advisable to require innovators to opt

amended in scattered sections of21 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.).
36. This can be thought of as a more meaningful form of the utility requirement of
patentability.
37. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Data Secrecy in the Age of Regulatory Exclusivity, in THE
LAW AND THEORY OF TRADE SECRECY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 467-91
(Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & Katherine J. Strandburg eds., 2012).
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for either patent rights or an RCS. 38
2. Collectively Governed Systems
Another alternative to the patent system that was discussed in depth
was collectively governed systems for innovation that do not rely on
exclusive legal rights. Professional norms and open source software are
examples. Such systems are not true alternatives to patents, but instead,
are systems that can coexist with patents. That is, the patent system and
specific doctrines often have a big impact on the viability of those other
systems, which affects not only the amount of innovation but also what
.
.
39
innovation we get.
These other institutions and how they interact with the patent
system can partly determine at what point in the innovation process we
should have patent rights. For example, with respect to pharmaceuticals,
patent doctrine has pushed exclusivity up the chain of generality so that
utility has ceased to be a requirement and is more like an exception.
That is, to get a patent on a new drug, one does not need to show that it
works at all; all that needs to be shown is that it might work. 40 Of
course, although patent law does not require efficacy, pre-marketing
regulation does require proof of efficacy and safety. 41
One explanation for the lack of new drugs in the pharmaceutical
industry is that the amount of exclusivity given is insufficient. As a
result, there is a lot of talk that the pharmaceutical companies are
interested in engaging in open innovation and public-private
partnerships. It is unclear whether this is a real attempt to change the

38. See generally Yaniv Heled, Why Primary Patents Covering Biologics Should be
Unenforceable Against Generic Applicants Under the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation
Act, 21 ANNALS HEALTH L. 211 (2012).
39. See, e.g., Katherine J. Strandburg, Legal But Acceptable: Pallin v. Singer and Physician
Patenting Norms, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AT THE EDGE: THE CONTESTED CONTOURS OF IP
321, 336-37 (R. Dreyfuss & J. Ginsburg eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2014) (describing section
287(c) of the Patent Act and how this provision interacts well with physicians' norms).
40. See In re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
41. 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (2012); see generally Katharine Van Tassel, Regulating in

Uncertainty: Animating the Product Public Health Safety Net to Capture Consumer Products that
Use Innovative Technologies such as Nanotechnology, Genetically Modified Food and Cloned
Meat, 2013 U. OF CHI. LEGAL F. 433 (describing the burden of proof that manufacturers bear to
establish both safety and effectiveness for drugs through the premarket approval process under the
Food, Drug, & Cosmetic Act); see also Jay Dratler, Jr., IP and Health Care: New Drugs Pricing
and Medical Mistakes, 7 AKRON INTELL. PROP. J. 1, 5 (2014) ("Not only do drug innovators have to
create something new, safe, and effective, they also have to prove it is safe and effective in large
scale clinical trials that are among the most complex, tricky, and expensive things that any industry
does.").
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institutional structure for innovation or whether it is just another road to
move invention and development towards subsidies rather than
exclusivities. 42 Nonetheless, it exemplifies the interplay between these
institutions. 43
Reputational credit and other non-pecuniary interests may also
incentivize innovation. Several participants thought these could play an
enormous and important role as there are situations where economically
motivated people use collaborative innovation. 44
Early in the
development of some industries, there are periods where everyone shares
everything. 45 To fully take advantage of these alternative motivating
forces we must engage in more research to understand when and why
this happens and what the pros and cons are when compared to the
market-based patent system.
Another suggested modification to the patent system was doing
more with exemptions to infringement. The basic idea is to have a fair
use doctrine in patent law, but unlike that in copyright law. 46 Such a
doctrine accounts for these alternative innovation systems and considers
their vitality in light of the existence of patents. 47 For example, if we
have an alternative system for promoting innovation in research, such as
42. Another explanation for the lack of new drug development is that too many early-stage
patents are hindering or actually blocking follow-on innovation. See Jay Dratler, Jr., Combinatorial
Mathematics and the Problem of Early-Stage Patents in Biotechnology (Univ. of Akron Sch. of
Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 06-13, 2007), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=959462. Because of these patent "thickets,"
pharmaceutical companies may be searching for alternatives.
43. Another example of this is taking place at The University of Akron, where the Timken
Company has partnered with the University and is engaging in open innovation with its core
technology to help foster further innovation in other industries where this technology may be useful
(e.g., biomedical products and devices) and to further develop the technology so it can be useful to
Timken. See New University Lab Promotes Idea-Sharing and Innovation, THE UNIVERSITY OF
AKRON
(Oct.
19,
2012),
http://www.uakron.edu/im/online-newsroom/
news_details.dot?newsld=3 lb l 6504-04a9-48d0-92fb
d489a94dfbbf&pageTitle=Top%20Story"/o20Headline&crumbTitle=New%20University%20lab%2
Opromotes%20idea-sharing%20and%20innovation.
44. See, e.g., Strandburg, supra note 39, at 336-37 (describing ophthalmologists rejecting
patents on surgical techniques because they have always documented originality by publication and
place information sharing and patient care as a higher priority).
45. See Robert C. Allen, Collective Invention, 4 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 1 passim (1983);
see also Peter B. Meyer, Episodes of Collective Invention (U.S Dept. of Labor, Bureau of Labor
available
at
Statistics,
Working
Paper
No.
368,
2003),
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=466880.
46. See generally Katherine J. Strandburg, Patent Fair Use 2.0, 1 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 265
(2011).
47. Id. at 299. This exemption is broader than the already existing, but limited, experimental
use exemption. See generally Katherine J. Strandburg, What Does the Public Get? Experimental
Use and the Patent Bargain, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 81 (2004 ).
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reputational interests, and this system does not use patents, then the
exemption should consider the fact that the alternative system may be
vulnerable to attacks from the outside (via patent infringement) because
it does not have blocking patents to assert as leverage. Although not
dispositive, this factor would weigh in favor of an exemption. 48
More concretely, if we think medical doctors are basically the only
people doing important innovative work in medical procedures and they
have a system in place that rewards innovation in medical procedure
without the use of patents, then we may want to sacrifice the occasional
electrical engineer who comes up with a great medical procedure
because allowing an outsider to have patent rights and enforce them
against the medical doctors would threaten the whole alternative
system. 49 This is the rationale behind section 287(c) of the Patent Act. 50
Section 287( c) extinguishes the remedy against infringing physicians
performing a patented medical procedure and effectively deals with the
inventor from outside the physician system as well as those inside the
system who want to defect and take their innovation to the market-based
patent system. 51 Such an exemption protects the alternative system. 52
As an institutional matter, we should really ask if we think the best
innovation will occur within one or more of these alternative systems. If
so, we should be willing to sacrifice a particular inventor so as to
preserve the alternative systems. Such a view of fair use could be used
to protect the alternative systems and could be narrowly tailored. 53
In sum, we must continue to consider what the patent system
should encourage and whether the Patent Act's current structure
achieves those ends. Despite these fundamental inquiries, policymakers
and health care stakeholders should closely consider the suggested
alternatives to patent law as they may spur innovation without the same
deadweight loss generated by patents.

48. See Strandburg, supra note 46, at 300-0 I.
49. See generally Strandburg, supra note 39, at 341-42.
50. See 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) (2012).
51. See id.
52. Id. Section 287(c) does not apply to drugs and medical products. 35 U.S.C. §
287(c)(2)(A) (2012) ('"[M]edical activity' means the performance of a medical or surgical
procedure on a body, but shall not include (i) the use of a patented machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter in violation of such patent, (ii) the practice of a patented use of a composition
of matter in violation of such patent, or (iii) the practice of a process in violation of a biotechnology
patent.").
53. Of course, such a proposal raises other questions, including whether such a system would
increase uncertainty and litigation costs and how the norms of the physicians would be established
in the courtroom.
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Ill. PROPRIETARY HEALTH INFORMATION

During the next portion of the Forum, the participants shifted their
focus to data about health care and health-related innovations. This
discussion was comprised of two parts. The first part dealt with data
related to pricing, costs, and value of health care. The second part dealt
with personal data and privacy.
A. Pricing, Costs, and Value
As illustrated by the interest in the use of RCSs, which provide
shelters from competition for disclosing, inter alia, clinical trial data, 54
there is an emphasis on IP protection not just for how products are made,
but also for information about products. What is needed is a way to
incentivize the creation of information about products and to incentivize
using the information in the health care system via comparative
effectiveness research about the products. Doing so will better equip
consumers and the government to understand how we pay for drugs. For
example, if a drug gives marginally better treatments for a disease, then
perhaps we should only pay marginally more for it. In essence, the
system should incentivize not just information creation, but also
disclosure of the information, including information about prices and
effectiveness. Disclosure of this type of information is distinct from
disclosures about safety and efficacy that already take place for
regulatory approval.
An underlying problem with respect to the use of data is the free
market economy does not work very well with respect to medical care.
The prices negotiated between the insurance companies and providers
are secret to everyone outside of the negotiation, such as other providers,
patients, and insurance companies. 55 This, in effect, creates a black
box. 56 Participants suggested that if more price information was
disclosed, then this may lead to more competition between health care
providers on quality rather than negotiating the best set of prices. This is
because patients could easily compare the prices and take them into
account, along with other information such as quality outcomes, when
deciding on a course of care. In short, the hope is for less innovation on
complex multivariate pricing formulas, which is a symptom of
financialization in certain areas, and a move towards good indicators of
54. See discussion supra Part 11.C.1.
55. See Frank Pasquale, Cultivating, Complementing, & Curbing IP Protections for Health
Care Data, (Oct. 22, 2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with reporter).
56. Id.
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quality and what is actually effective.
For example, in a study of pricing data for chest x-rays at California
hospitals, some hospitals charged patients close to $200 while another
charged approximately $1,500. 57 Likewise, in Boston, a study showed
that Massachusetts General Hospital (MGH) charged $51,000 for
coronary bypass procedures whereas the Boston Medical Center charged
$34,000 for the same procedure. 58 It may be that MGH provides better
services, obtains better results, or receives the more difficult cases. But
if consumers have access to the data, then they can analyze it to see if
the different pricing is based on quality differentials or differential
pricing power. It was noted, however, that some services are easy to
compare between providers, such as taking an x-ray. Nearly every
provider does this the same way, making it easy to compare. But
diagnosis is completely different. The unique circumstances of each
patient complicate this comparison between providers. As a result,
disclosure of pricing data may effectively create competition on quality
of care in some circumstances, but may be less helpful in others.
Assuming disclosure of pricing data results in a net gain, an
important question is how we use certain levers in health law to reveal
how certain things are priced. Small steps have been made toward
getting inside the black box. 59
Some participants hope that
implementing health care reform will provide easier access to this data
because there will be more of an emphasis on revealing it. 60
The black box nature of health care data distinguishes its pricing
from other markets - no one goes in knowing the price. Patients'
inability to negotiate further distinguishes the health care market. If you
go to the hospital with a kidney stone, you are not going to negotiate a
price - you are paying whatever it costs to fix the problem. As stated by
one participant, "health economics is the poster child for market failure."
We cannot have a pure free market system for health care in the United
States because there are so many built-in exceptions to the neoclassical

57. Lucette Lagnado, California Hospitals Open Books. Showing Huge Price Dijjerences,
WALL
ST.
J.
(Dec.
27,
2004,
12:01
AM)
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB 110410465492809649.html.
58. Aaron Atencio, Comparable Quality, Different Prices, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 16, 2008,
http://www.boston.com/news/health/articles/2008/l l/16/differentprices.
59. See generally Uwe E. Reinhardt, The Pricing of U.S. Hospital Services: Chaos Behind a
Veil ofSecrecy, 25 HEALTH AFF. 57 (2006).
60. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 2718, 124 Stat. 119,
136-37 (codified as amended in scattered sections of26 U.S.C., 31 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.) (2010);
see also How to Research Health Care Prices, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 4, 2009),
http://guides.wsj.com/health/health-costs/how-to-research-health-care-prices.
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free market, such as information asymmetry, lack of choice, and lack of
transparency. 61 Third-party payment further complicates this situation,
as the person paying (the insurer) is not the person receiving the benefit
(the patient). Given this difference in market structure, why do we allow
a black box system to exist? Protection of this type of data makes it so
there is no rational relationship between the price that is billed and the
service provided. 62
With this skepticism about health care markets, what should be
done about them? Rhetorically, one participant questioned if we were
proposing a public utilities commission model for health care.
Participants suggested several possible solutions or improvements to the
market problem. First, it was noted that some areas had a system where
all insurers paid the same price to the same hospital (a most favored
nation type system). 63 If the provider charged $850 to an insurer for a
particular procedure, then it must charge $850 to all insurers for the
same procedure. A different provider could charge a different price,
however. These most favored nation clauses could help the market
distortion problem at least between insurers and providers.
A second suggestion was administered pricing, which is a system
with a formula that takes into consideration multiple factors, such as the
skill of the doctor, how much effort is required, how much concentration
is needed, how much time the procedure takes, etcetera. 64 Despite the
attraction of administered pricing, it is very slow to change. For
example, we may have a procedure at time zero and it is very laborious.
But later we have a change in technology that makes the procedure much
easier to perform. Until the inputs to the formula are updated, the
providers are still paid at the higher rate. It oftentimes takes a long
period of time for the change in price to take effect.
A third suggestion was using the data available from other countries
61. This is not necessarily the case for all medical procedures, however. Elective procedures
appear to be the exception. Lasik surgery is a great example. The cost of Lasik was pretty high, but
now it is fairly cheap because consumers have the ability to shop around and get the best
combination of quality and price.
62. Compare this with the market-based system underlying patent law discussed supra Part
II.

63. James C. DeChane, Preferred Provider Organization Strnctures and Agreements, 4
ANNALS HEALTH L. 35, 59-62 (1995); Anthony J. Dennis, Most Favored Nation Contract Clauses
Under the Antitrnst Laws, 20 U. DAYTON L. REV. 821, 822-24 (1995); Arnold Celnicker, A

Competitive Analysis of Most Favored Nations Clauses in Contracts Between Health Care
Providers and Insurers, 69 N.C. L. REV. 863, 868-69 (1991).
64. Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, The Most Important Health Care legislation of the Millennium
(So Far): The Medicare Modernization Act, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS 437, 439 n.14
(2005).
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as a guide for health care pricing in the United States. These countries
permit use of the same procedures and equipment as the United States
and they make their data available. 65 These countries allow one price to
be charged for procedure X, and the price is public. Of course, it may
not be the "right" price for the United States, but it could be used as a
good baseline to compare the American prices to and to ask why
providers here are charging so much more. 66
A fourth suggestion for an alternative to the current market
structure is Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs). "An ACO
generally is defined as a local organization comprised of and controlled
by primary care physicians, specialists, and other providers that are
jointly accountable for the cost and quality of the full continuum of care
delivered to a patient population." 67 Right now, chronic illness accounts
for a large portion of the total cost of health care. 68 By some estimates,
20% of patients make up 80% of the costs. 69 ACOs are tasked with
reducing what they spend while maintaining quality over a given
population. 70 If they are successful, then the ACOs receive additional
money. 71
Despite focusing on solutions that using data could provide, it was
pointed out that data will not answer all of the questions. There are still
value judgments to be made behind the data. For example, we may have
a more effective pill that can be taken once per week instead of daily.
Because of this, the pill generates an increased rate of compliance, but
the weekly pill costs more than the daily pill. How do we value the
patient's convenience? Do we take the attitude that if people cannot be
bothered to take their medicine once a day, then we should not be
willing to pay an extra $100 for their convenience? No consensus was

65. See,
e.g., Alberta Health Care Insurance Plan (2012), available at
http://www.health.alberta.ca/documents/SOMB-Medical-Prices-2012-04.pdf; Ontario Ministry of
Health and Long-Term Care, Schedule of Benefits for Physician Services Under the Health
available
at
http://www.health.gov.on.ca/english/providers/
Insurance
Act
(2013),
program/ohip/sob/physserv/physserv_mn.html.
66. One commentator points out that many variables affect pricing across national
boundaries, such as customs, exchange rates, and standards of living, and queries whether it would
be better to study the effect of secrecy and regulation on pricing.
67. Jessica L. Mantel, Accountable Care Organizations: Can We Have Our Cake and Eat it
Too?, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 1393, 1410 (2012).
68. Mark W. Stanton, The High Concentration of U.S. Health Care Expenditures, RESEARCH
IN ACTION, June 2006, at 3, available at http://www.ahrq.gov/research/findings/
factsheets/costs/expriach/expendria.pdf.
69. Id.
70. Mantel, supra note 67, at 1410-11.
71. Id.
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reached among the participants on how to make these value judgments,
but everyone agreed that they can and should play an important role.
Most participants agreed that the health care market is in failure and
is replete with problems caused, in part, by a lack of access to pricing
and quality data. The suggestions discussed at the Forum aimed to
reduce the opacity of health care and to explore the few advances that
have been made. Nonetheless, a tremendous amount of reform is still
required.

B. Personal Data and Privacy
Not all health care data are the same. 72 The discussion up to this
point focused on pricing and value data. But personal and genetic data
could be very helpful in providing better health care. However, laws
such as the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996
(HIP AA) 73 and the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008
(GINA) 74 may protect this type of data from disclosure and complicate
efforts to obtain it. For example, one research organization reported that
HIP AA ( 1) reduced patient recruitment; (2) increased selection bias; (3)
increased the costs of research by requiring additional paperwork and
complicating Institutional Review Board (IRB) processes; (4) increased
errors when de-identified information was used; and (5) caused project
abandonment. 75 The difficulties created by privacy laws raised the
following questions: whether protection for personal health data is
important, and whether these privacy laws create obstacles to the
medical profession using digital technology to share such data.
Some participants argued that some patients are not very concerned
about their personal health data because they do not suffer from any
illness or condition that would cause them to be embarrassed, ridiculed,
or discriminated against. The argument continued that because many (or
perhaps most) patients are not concerned about their personal health
data, the laws protecting such data create needless inefficiencies and
72. See Timothy S. Hall, The Quantified Self Movement: Legal Challenges and Benefits of
Personal Biometric Data Tracking, 7 AKRON INTELL. PROP. J. 27, 27-28 (2014) (describing
purchasing data predicting influenza outbreaks and the use of biometric data from pedometers and
nutritional tracking apps to improve health outcomes of individuals).
73. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110
Stat. 1936 (1996)(codified as amended in scattered sections of 18, 26, 29, & 42 U.S.C.).
74. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122 Stat. 881
(2008) (codified as amended in scattered sections of26, 29, & 42 U.S.C.)
75. Fred H. Cate, Protecting Privacy in Health Research: The Limits ofIndividual Choice, 98
CALIF. L. REV. 1765, 1795-96 (2010) (quoting Subcomm. on Privacy and Confidentiality, National
Comm. on Vital and Health Statistics (Nov. 19, 2003)).
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make using the personal health data more difficult.
Several participants took issue with this argument. One participant
argued that what prevents the medical profession from using technology
that would support the interchange of data is the lack of standards and
the interchangeability of file formats. 76 Another participant noted that
the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 provides
incentives to make meaningful use of health records, so steps are being
made to solve this problem. 77
Another response to the needless inefficiency argument was that we
should not think about privacy in a choice paradigm (i.e., that privacy is
wholly about whether one thinks his or her information is private). The
problem with this model is that for any particular topic, an
overwhelming majority of people do not care about protecting their
information. 78 Therefore, if a vote on any one particular issue were held,
the result would always be to share the information.
So privacy is really a minority protective device and a social
concept. It is not good enough to say that we can let people decide, and
if someone has a special reason to keep his or her information private,
then he or she can ask for it to be kept private. The problem with this is
that if one asks for his or her information to be kept private, then those
seeking the information know the person has the condition, disease,
etcetera. Others echoed this belief and stated that an opt-out system is
not necessarily the best path for health data.
In short, privacy is more complicated than the choice paradigm
makes it seem, and this makes the conceptual framework for privacy
very important. Despite its importance, the large problem that exists in
discussions about health privacy is that there is no clear conceptual
framework for what we are worried about. This makes it very difficult
to create a system tailored to research and privacy.
IV. CONFLICTS WITH NON-IP VALUES

The final topic of discussion at the IP Forum revolved around IP
values conflicting with non-IP values. The conversation began by
recognizing that patents are frequently justified on efficient innovation
76. See Pasquale, supra note 55, at 18. ("But to integrate and to port data, all systems need to
be able to translate symptoms, diagnoses, interventions, and outcomes into commonly recognized
coding.").
77. See American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 13101, 123
Stat. 115, 234-38 (2009) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300jj-12 (2009)).
78. PRISCILLA M. REGAN, LEGISLATING PRIVACY: TECHNOLOGY, SOCIAL VALUES, AND
PUBLIC POLICY 233 (Univ. North Carolina Press 1995).
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incentlv1zmg grounds, but other interests, such as human rights,
morality, ethics, and ordre public may also play an important role. 79 If
these conflicts exist, how can they be resolved? The predominate focus
of the discussion revolved around health care and the lack of
pharmaceuticals in developing countries.
One participant suggested that it is impossible to put off talking
about these competing values. These values are part and parcel of every
aspect of our patent system. Because we have values other than
efficiently incentivizing innovation, we should not think of these various
values as destroying and undermining the IP system. Instead, we should
think of the IP system as a flexible one that allows for accommodation
when there is a conflict. To this end, international activists are working
through the political process to push for recognition of these values and
to create more flexibility within TRIPS. 80
International patent law, it was argued, needs modification to allow
these other values to flourish. TRIPS "hardened" the patent system by
creating a floor of strong intellectual property rights; 81 thus, it has
become more difficult to craft national laws that incorporate other
values. As such, although pharmaceutical companies have the choices to
be green, be humane, or prioritize other values at the expensive of their
bottom lines, TRIPS does little to promote these choices. Importantly,
under an exclusive rights regime, the pharmaceutical companies' choices
are all but final. The grassroots pushback for a humanitarian or human
rights-based model is to focus on implementation of statutory schemes in
developing countries that maximize TRIPS-compliant flexibilities rather

79. See. e.g., KARA W. SWANSON, Patents, Politics, and Abortion, in INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW IN CONTEXT: LAW AND SOCIETY PERSPECTIVES ON IP 6 (William T. Gallagher &
Debora J. Halbert eds., Cambridge Univ. Press, forthcoming 2014) (describing the PTO as choosing
the less-controversial option to defend a rule against patenting life given the politics focused on life
in the 1970s); see also Jeffrey M. Samuels, Up In Smoke Down Under I (Oct. 29, 2012)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with reporter) (describing the conflict between trademark rights
and public health vis
vis the Australian High Court's decision regarding The Tobacco Plain
Packaging Act); James Ming Chen, Bioprospect Theory, 7 AKRON INTELL. PROP. J. 19, 26 (2014)
(recommending the use of bioprospect theory as a means for humanity to "eschew the remote
prospect of wealth ... and focus on how it might better manage anthropogenic ecological disasters
before they become full-blown, irreversible cataclysms of global proportions").
80. Some examples of international activist organizations include: Doctors without Borders;
Access to Medicines Campaign; Oxfam; Health Global Access Projects; Knowledge Ecology
International; Public Citizens Global Access to Medicines Program; Treatment Action Campaign
(South Afiica); and Lawyers' Collective (India).
81. Sean A Pager, Patents on a Shoestring: Making Patent Protection Work for Developing
Countries, 23 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 755, 755-57 (2007); Amy Kapczynski, Harmonization and its
Discontents: A Case Study of TRIPS Implementation in India's Pharmaceutical Sector, 97 CALIF. L.
REV. 1571, 1571-72 (2009).
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than further "hardening" patent law with TRIPS-plus IP protections and
enforcement measures. 82 Preserving and promoting TRIPS's flexibility
would allow implementation to be done differently in one country if it
chose to do so.
In response, an argument was made that if patents encourage drug
development, then the current generation disregarding patent rights for
an immediate benefit may result in fewer new drugs for subsequent
generations. This effect flows from the unwillingness of future potential
innovators to take the risk of ignored and unenforced patents. In reply to
this concern, some participants argued that pharmaceutical companies
could continue to price discriminate, but should not be allowed to cut off
access to massive parts of the world and keep data secret. Although not
economically beneficial for consumers in higher-paying countries, price
discrimination does open up access to medicine for citizens of poorer
countries. 83
Some participants focused on the economics behind the drug
industry and pointed out that the real goal should be to sell the drug at a
rate that is not so high that the citizens of these less developed countries
cannot afford the care they need. The problem, from the drug
companies' perspectives, is arbitrage. 84 To help solve the arbitrage
problem, one participant suggested creating audit trails on supply chains.
That is, we already have systems that watch us as individuals, so why
not have a similar system for drugs that indicates, for example, that
drugs with codes stating "Made for Botswana" are illegal in the United
States?
By engaging in this type of price discrimination, the
pharmaceutical companies can charge market-appropriate amounts for
their products, while still providing the drugs to those in less developed
countries. This system would help pharmaceutical companies contain
arbitrage. We do this with importation restrictions in developed
countries. 85
Similarly, pharmaceutical companies might also use
technological means of avoiding international arbitrage, as was done
with DVD country codes, 86 by a method of required color-coding or the
82. Kapczynski, supra note 81, at 1573.
83. Dratler, supra note 41, at 13 (describing how pricing drugs below cost in less developed
countries "could save millions of lives around the world and still give the [pharmaceutical
company's] investors a satisfactory rate of return").
84. See Kevin Outterson, Pharmaceutical Arbitrage: Balancing Access and Innovation in
International Prescription Drug Markets, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y, L. & ETHICS 193, 195-96
(2005).
85. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 331(t) (2012).
86. Robert C. Denicola, Fair's Fair: An Argument for Mandatory Disclosure of
Technological Protection Measures, 11 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. I, 12 (2004) ("DVDs
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like.
A different model of resolving the conflicts between IP values and
other values was illustrated by the example of the Medicines Patent
Pool. 87 This group uses transparency in the negotiation process to put
together a patent pool for producing HIVI AIDS drugs in less developed
countries. 88 It negotiates licenses with pharmaceutical companies and
puts on its web site the licenses it has executed and the status of the
negotiations it is having with different pharmaceutical companies. 89
Although it is too early to know how effective it will be, this
organization appears to put pressure on pharmaceutical companies that
care about their reputation to expand their markets for life-saving
medicines to countries that need it most. 90
The conflict between values certainly creates a tough problem.
Resolving these conflicts requires an appreciation of both short-term and
long-term consequences, an understanding of different cultures and
economies, and compassion. It also requires an understanding of
economics, so as to avoid killing the goose of research that lays the
golden egg of new drugs. There are no easy answers, but interesting
work is beginning to achieve a result that strikes an appropriate balance
between competing values.
V. CONCLUSION
As illustrated above, participants at the Sixth Annual Forum raised
and exhaustively discussed a number of current issues. The intersection
of IP and public health raises issues dealing with economic theories,
human and corporate motivation, the process of innovation, privacy, and
human rights. Unfortunately, but not surprisirigly, the participants did
not resolve the conflicts between these thorny issues. Nonetheless, the
discussion that took place contributed greatly towards exploring the
problems and consequences from and the solutions and alternatives to
have included copy protection since their inception; they also contain embedded regional codes
designed to limit play to DVD players coded for a particular geographic region.").
87. See generally MEDICINES PATENT POOL, http://www.medicinespatentpool.org (last
visited Aug. 20, 2014).
88. Id.
89. See
Company
Engagement,
MEDICINES
PATENT
POOL,
http://www.medicinespatentpool.org/licensing/company-engagement (last visited Aug. 20, 2014).
90. Krista L. Cox, The Medicines Patent Pool: Promoting Access and Innovation for Life
Saving Medicines Through Voluntary Licenses, 4 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 291, 301 (2012)
(noting that "[p]harmaceutical companies should commit to the corporate social responsibility they
claim to exercise and ensure life-saving medicines are accessible to those living in developing
countries by licensing to the patent pool.").
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these issues. It is the hope of all the IP Scholars Forum participants that
this White Paper will help steer future discussions about IP and public
health and serve as a starting point for future analysis and just resolution
of these problems.

